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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an industry-level model of growth and trade, in which evolving specialization
patterns are the endogenous result of innovation, international technology spillovers, learning-by-
doing and balance of payments-restricted growth. Differences between industries with regard to their
share in consumption are shown to reinforce or mitigate the effects of specialization on aggregate
productivity convergence patterns, depending on other parameters. The implications of the model are
studied by means of simulation analyses for a wide range of parameter conﬁgurations.
1. INTRODUCTION
The productivity growth performance of countries has always been of central
interest to economists. Over time, many theories about the sources of growth
have been proposed, tested and reﬁned. In most theories, technological
progress emerges as the engine of growth. But the nature of the technology–
growth relationship remains a matter of debate. Given that technological
change contains a considerable degree of uncertainty, one of the most
debated issues at a fundamental level is about the predictability of growth
patterns. In the words of Kaldor (1996, p. 22):
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2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USAIn contrast to the neo-classical economists who believed that economics should be
pursued [. . .] making use of the same type of tools as mechanics, the English
classical economists saw human societies as being in a continuous process of evo-
lution, [. . .] [having] more in common with the laws of biology (including the basic
unpredictability of the lines of development) than with the methods of the sciences
concerned with inanimate matter, such as physics.
In the contemporary literature, this fundamental difference of insight with
regard to the nature and predictability of the growth process and the role of
technology in it has been staged in the debate between ‘evolutionary’ econo-
mists (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982) and the neo-classical inspired new
growth theory (e.g. Romer, 1990). New growth theory considers economic
growth as a smooth steady-state phenomenon that may be tuned in a rela-
tively straightforward way by technology and innovation policies. The evo-
lutionary approach, on the other hand, argues that patterns of economic
growth are much more unpredictable, and that innovation policy may often
have unintended effects.
1
As the above quotation of Kaldor already points out, however, there are
also other approaches in economic growth theory that would point to the
‘historical’ and unpredictable nature of the technology–economic growth
relation. These are to be found in the (modern) classical approach to eco-
nomics, as well as the post-Keynesian approach.
The main aim of this paper is to explore the consequences of a model in
which a number of forces related to technological change are united. These
forces are taken from various parts of the literature, and contain elements
inducing smooth growth paths, as well as elements more in accordance with
the evolutionary or classical view of unpredictability.
Building on the existing literature, three sources of technological progress
are discerned: innovation, international knowledge spillovers (or imitation),
and learning-by-doing. We feel that a model that presents a uniﬁed frame-
work is asked for, because many complications blur the comparability of
the major lessons to be learnt from more partial models. We therefore put
these three forces together onto a skeleton model of international economic
interaction, and explore the parameter space of the model by means of
simulation analysis. The model describes the evolution of a system of two
trading economies that consist of multiple industries. The productivity
growth rates of industries, as well as the specialization patterns of coun-
tries, are the outcome of the interplay between innovation, spillovers and
1 Verspagen (2004) summarizes this debate in more detail than is possible here.
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ranges of parameter space that yield stable, steady state-like patterns of
convergence between countries, as well as for parameter ranges that yield
more unstable patterns (including divergence between countries). This
approach allows us to draw some broad conclusions about the character-
istics (in terms of parameter values) of technological progress for which
aggregate labor productivity levels of countries tend to be relatively equal
and to describe the corresponding specialization patterns.
International trade plays an important role in our model. Especially the
effects of learning-by-doing are highly dependent on the export performance
of countries. Moreover, the international competitiveness of a country’s
products is affected by its technological standards vis-à-vis its rivals. Conse-
quently, a process of virtuous or vicious circles emerges, which also affects
the industry structure. Thus, the model sees as parts of an international
interdependent system countries, and is thus likely to yield different out-
comes than model that consider countries as autarkic entities.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will discuss the
sources of productivity growth and their impact on the international growth
process according to several growth theories. Special attention will be
devoted to the interactions of these sources with changes in the industry
structure and international trade. Sections 3 and 4 deal with the model
equations. In section 5, we will analyze the behavior of the model, mainly by
means of simulation analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2. GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Most economists will agree that in the long run, technological change is one
of the main sources of economic growth. But technology has its impact on the
economy in many different forms. Looking at the literature on growth and
technology, one may distinguish three main sources of technological change.
The ﬁrst, and perhaps most direct, way is through research and develop-
ment activities, carried out by ﬁrms as well as (semi-)public research organi-
zations. The role of R&D in economic growth is the topic of the endogenous
growth literature that started with Romer (1986, 1990). The endogenous
growth literature contains many different ways of representing the impact of
technology and R&D on economic growth. Romer (1990) proposed a model
of horizontal product differentiation, in which the main source of produc-
tivity growth is an expanding variety of consumption goods, or intermediate
goods used to produce a homogenous consumption good. Aghion and
Howitt (1992) suggest a model of vertical product differentiation, where
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product varieties with higher quality.
One crucial aspect of the models in this tradition is the existence of tech-
nological spillovers, which we consider as the second source of technological
change. Technological knowledge has aspects of a public good. In technical
terms, technology spillovers are the offsetting force for decreasing marginal
returns to investment, and hence make growth possible in the long run.
Empirical models of R&D spillovers between countries (e.g. Coe and
Helpman, 1995; Verspagen, 1997) tend to ﬁnd that for many countries,
especially the small but developed ones, technology spillovers are an impor-
tant source of growth. Grossman and Helpman (1991) present theoretical
models of R&D spillovers between countries. Because they assume that
spillovers are stronger within country borders, and spillovers stimulate own
R&D efforts, country size is an important determinant of R&D. Moreover,
they argue that spillovers (and endogenous R&D) are important drivers of
the trade specialization pattern of countries. Hence, trade, specialization and
economic growth become interwoven in a causal manner (in much the same
way as in Dosi et al., 1990 and Krugman, 1990). Such a relationship between
trade, specialization and economic growth is an important topic of the model
we present below, and is also addressed by other theoretical streams, which
we will survey shortly below.
Technology spillovers also play a role in other parts of the literature. For
example, based on the work of Gerschenkron (1962), Abramovitz (1979)
suggests that technological imitation by relatively backward countries is an
important way of ‘catching-up’. Literature in this tradition, which has been
summarized in Fagerberg (1994), tries to identify empirically the factors that
make technological imitation easier. Viewed in this way, technological spill-
overs become a potential source of convergence between countries.
The third source of technological change that we will discuss can be char-
acterized as learning-by-doing or cumulative learning. This is an important
topic in both the early literature (e.g. Young, 1928; Verdoorn, 1949; Arrow,
1962) and some of the new growth models (e.g. Young, 1991). Technological
change is generated as a result of experience in production or use. Such a
mechanism generates positive feedback, i.e. high rates of technological
progress result from high activity levels, or high growth of activity levels. A
variety of mechanisms can be used to explain this phenomenon at the micro-
economic level. Most of these explanations argue that ideas and procedures
for small (incremental) innovations related to implementation may emerge as
a result of using a technology. Although every single incremental innovation
may be small, their joint cumulative effect is often large, as is for example
shown in the historical studies of Habakkuk (1962).
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countries. If using a technology enhances learning, the ones who are most
successful at this will also learn most: success breeds success. This implies a
tendency for divergence of technology levels between countries, rather than
convergence. Kaldor (1966) and Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) use this argu-
ment to make a point about persistence of growth rate differentials between
regions. Cimoli (1994), in extending Cimoli (1988), provides a model in this
tradition in which trade, specialization and growth are jointly modeled. In a
similar fashion, Lucas (1988) presents a model about persistence of growth
rate differentials between countries.
A ﬁnal view on the role of technology in economic growth that we will
survey brieﬂy is the structural view. Contrary to the previous three streams,
this does not represent a source of technology, but rather argues how the
industrial composition of an economy interacts with technological change,
and may produce different macro-growth patterns between countries. Dif-
ferences between industries may be directly related to technology, through
variables such as technological opportunity or age of the technology. But
also more indirect variables, such as income elasticities, may play a role here,
although only in combination with the more direct differences in technology
between industries. If industries are characterized by different rates of pro-
ductivity growth, or by different rates of demand growth (through, for
example, income elasticities), economic structure becomes important for
aggregate economic growth. This is a topic that is mostly explored in the
post-Keynesian literature, such as Thirlwall (1979) and Pasinetti (1981).
Whereas Pasinetti (1981) considers this topic mostly in the context of a closed
economy, Thirlwall (1979) brings in foreign demand, and hence trade and
specialization (similar to Krugman, 1990 and Grossman and Helpman,
1991). In Thirlwall’s approach, the composition of exports and imports, and
especially their respective income elasticities determine the growth potential
of nations through balance-of-payments constraints.
The model developed in this paper aims to unite these different views on
the technology–economic growth relationship. The model will be used to
analyze how the mix of relative importance of the various mechanisms will
affect the likelihood of convergence or divergence between countries in terms
of their productivity levels. Thus, our model will take the form of a generic
skeleton. On top of this skeleton, three different forms of technological
change may be imposed: an (exogenous) steady-state exponential growth rate
of productivity (we consider this as a simpliﬁed version of the endogenous
R&D story), international technology spillovers between industries and pro-
ductivity growth in the form of cumulative learning.
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In order to keep the model relatively simple, we abstract from any other
production factor than labor and further assume that commodities are pro-
duced for consumption purposes only.
2 The world economy consists of two
countries, called North (N) and South (S). In this world, n commodities are
produced. Both countries are assumed to be able to produce all commodities,
but nothing precludes a situation in which some of the commodities are
produced in just one country. The characteristics of a speciﬁc commodity are
assumed to be independent of its country of origin. Consumption demand
can be met by domestically produced and/or by imported commodities.
In each period, the output and employment levels for both countries are
the result of the interplay of a number of state variables, presented in table 1.
The ﬁrst set of state variables represents the technologies in use. The
variables indicate the physical amounts of labor required to produce physical
units of output, in each of the industries in North and South. Labor is
supposed to be homogeneous, in the sense that workers can immediately and
freely move from one industry to another. On the other hand, we assume that
labor is immobile in a geographical sense, i.e. that workers do not migrate
from North to South or vice versa. The second set of variables indicates the
fractions of domestically produced outputs in consumption, for each of the
commodities and for both countries. The third set reﬂects the preferences of
consumers in both countries. These variables are deﬁned as the shares of total
consumption in a country devoted to a particular good, measured in constant
prices. Finally, the fourth set of state variables indicates the prices of the
goods, expressed in a common currency.
2 See Los and Verspagen (2000) for a more elaborate model with intermediate input structures.
In a qualitative sense, all conclusions are robust to the inclusion of input–output relations
between industries.
Table 1. State variables
1. l i
c
N , l i
c
S (i = 1 ,...,n) Labor requirements per unit of output
2. zNi, zSi (i = 1...,n) Shares of domestically produced consumption
goods in consumption demand
3. bNi, bSi (i = 1 ,...,n;
SbNi = 1, SbSi = 1)
Shares of commodities in aggregate
consumption
4. PNi, PSi (i = 1 ,...,n) Commodity prices
Note: Indices N and S refer to North and South, respectively.
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consumption vectors would only by chance yield a balance-of-payments
(current account) equilibrium. As McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) argue,
nothing prevents a country from being caught in a situation of current
account deﬁcits for a short time. In the long run, however, such a state of
affairs is unsustainable unless capital inﬂows keep coming in inﬁnitely and
in steadily increasing amounts. Moreover, inﬁnitely cumulating stocks of
Southern (Northern) currency would not improve North’s (South’s) welfare.
Following Thirlwall (1979) and Verspagen (2001), we assume that total
consumption levels in North and South must always correspond to balance-
of-payments equilibrium. In reality, this does not necessarily happen immedi-
ately, but we consider this as a necessary simpliﬁcation in the model. As we
consider a closed system without exports and imports to and from third
countries, we could write North’s current account surplus (or deﬁcit) as the
difference between the value of the goods imported by South and the value of
goods imported by North (see McCombie, 1993 for a similar approach).
Hence,currentaccountequilibriumprevailsifandonlyifthefollowingholds:
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in which fN and fS denote the total consumption levels (in constant prices) in
North and South, respectively. This equation can be rewritten in a way that
expresses the current account-equilibrium consumption level in South in











































Equation (2) shows that the solutions that represent current account equi-
librium together constitute a line in the plane fN - fS. Since prices and con-
sumption shares are always positive and trade shares cannot exceed 1, the
slope of the line is positive. The interpretation of this result is rather straight-
forward. Increased consumption in North induces more imports from South,
which enables South to import more from North. Given current account
equilibrium, these imports increase South’s consumption. The value of the
slope depends on the relative prices (exporting a cheap good does not earn
much money for South to import expensive goods from North), the trade
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Northern consumption if North produces its own goods, or if South imports
virtually everything) and the consumption shares (South does not gain much
by exporting a good that is hardly demanded by North).
In order to determine a unique short-run solution for fN and fS, (i.e. to
choose a speciﬁc point on the current account equilibrium line), we have to
impose an additional equation. We assume that one of the countries is
constrained by available labor resources. In each period, either employment
in North equals its labor supply (lN
sup) or employment in South equals its labor
supply (lS
sup), depending on which country reaches its constraint ﬁrst. Labor
supply is exogenous and does not change over time. Since trade implies that
employment levels in North do not only depend on North’s own consump-
tion but also on consumption in South (and vice versa), the full employment
assumptions yield another two relations between the two total consumption
levels fS and fN. Full employment prevails in North if and only if
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Since both the numerator and the denominator of the slope coefﬁcient are
positive, the line described by equation (4) is downward sloping. If the
consumption level in North would be reduced, the consumption level in
South would have to increase in order to keep the Northern labor previously
employed in the production of domestically demanded output at work. The
slope itself is determined by productivity coefﬁcients, trade coefﬁcients and
consumer preferences. Analogously, we can ﬁnd a relation corresponding to
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tion is both balance of payments-constrained and resource-constrained, but
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Of course, we can also ﬁnd the intersection of the upward sloping balance-
of-payments line (2) and the downward sloping line (5), which corresponds to
resources and balance-of-payments constraints on South’s consumption and
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The short-run equilibrium point in the (fN, fS) plane is now deﬁned as the
minimum of the points given by equations (6) and (7), since one country
would produce above its capacity in the other intersection point. In this
short-run equilibrium one of the two countries will thus experience unem-
ployment.
3 Given these consumption levels and their composition with
regard to industries and countries of origin, the output levels and its industry
compositions in North and South can be determined for the period under
consideration:
qz b f z b f q z b f z b f
i
ii i i i i i i i i NN N N S S S S N N N S S S and
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Finally, commodity-speciﬁc prices (expressed in a common currency, assum-
ing an exchange rate which is known at the beginning of each period) are
assumed to reﬂect labor costs:




NN N S S S and , , == = () 1... (9)
The symbols wN and wS denote the nominal wage rates (in North and South,
expressed in the national currencies), which we assume to be given at the
3 Note that our notion of equilibrium does not imply equality of labor supply and demand at the
world level.
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each period) is denoted by x. This implies that we adopt the rule to express
both Northern and Southern prices in Southern currency.
The short-run model we introduced in this section yields output and
employment levels by industry and country, as well as consumption levels for
each of the commodities produced in North and South. These levels are
completely determined by the production technologies, trade relations, con-
sumer preferences, labor supply, prices, the exchange rate and the nominal
wage rates prevailing during a period. Since we are primarily interested in the
long-run dynamics of the endogenous variables mentioned, we now turn to
the speciﬁcation of the equations that describe the intertemporal behavior of
the variables that we have assumed so far to be fully exogenous.
4. MODEL DESCRIPTION: INTERTEMPORAL RELATIONS
In this section we present the intertemporal equations that allow us to study
long-run issues such as output growth, convergence and structural change.
Unlike the previous section, this section does not include the derivation of
solutions. Due to the mathematical complexity caused by our explicit focus
on economies consisting of multiple industries, analytical solutions are hard
to derive. We will ﬁrst deal with the equations describing technological
progress and subsequently discuss the relations we speciﬁed with regard to
trade share dynamics and exchange rate movements.
4.1 Technology dynamics
Following our earlier interindustry models of technological change (Los,
2001; Verspagen, 2001), we model innovation as changes of input coefﬁ-
cients. We deﬁne the (industry-speciﬁc) rates of technological progress as the
proportional changes of the inverses of the l
c coefﬁcients, i.e. the ratios
between output and labor input. We write the dynamics of labor inputs per
unit of output as








NN N SS S and + () =+ () ( ) + () =+ () ( ) 11 11 γγ (10)
We allow both for differences in productivity growth rates between industries
and between countries. We model two regimes. In the ﬁrst regime, the indus-
try under consideration has lower labor requirements per unit of output than
its foreign competitor. In this case, we call the industry in this country the
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lagging industry.
We assume that leader industries experience technological progress
through two mechanisms. First, a constant exogenous productivity growth
rate is assumed, which reﬂects the labor-saving effects of innovation.
4 This
reﬂects the (neo-classical) idea of steady-state growth at a ﬁxed rate. Second,
a mechanism that we label the Kaldor–Verdoorn mechanism represents
cumulative learning: if the output of an industry grows, it is assumed that
learning-by-doing and opportunities for specialization of workers lead to
increased productivity.
In the lagging-behind regime, we assume that the Kaldor–Verdoorn
mechanism is still functioning, but that the exogenous ﬁxed rate of techno-
logical progress is absent. Instead, in the lagging country, the technology gap
to the leader industry is assumed to cause spillovers through imitation of the
competitor’s production technology.
Summarizing, the reductions in labor coefﬁcients under the two regimes




































































in which k (>0), s (>1), r (>0) and a (0 < a < 1) are industry-speciﬁc param-
eters and li
c* indicates the unit labor requirements in the corresponding leader
industry. k and s relate to the Kaldor–Verdoorn mechanism taken from
Verspagen (1993) and reﬂect the rate of dynamic learning. The mechanism
brings a positive feedback into the dynamic model, since high output growth
leads to high productivity growth (although at a decreasing marginal rate).
r is the steady-state rate of technological progress in the leading
industry; a reﬂects the spillover mechanism in the lagging country. The larger
the productivity gap in terms of labor inputs per unit of output, the faster
4 For simplicity, we do not include stochastic arrivals of innovations, nor do we incorporate
explicit search for innovations (R&D) in the model. See Los (2001) for an interindustry model
with R&D and stochastic innovation in a single-country context.
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reﬂect social capability for assimilating spillovers (Abramovitz, 1979), which
means this is taken as an exogenous factor. Note, however, that our multi-
industry speciﬁcation implicitly takes account of the fact that incompatibility
of output structures plays an important role, i.e. technological congruence is
endogenous. For example, if South would lag North in one industry but
produces only a very small part of its output in this industry, aggregate labor
productivity would not beneﬁt much from this industry-speciﬁc technology
gap.
4.2 Trade share dynamics
Trade share dynamics are assumed to be ruled by changes in relative com-
petitiveness. According to traditional theory, the competitiveness of coun-
tries is determined by costs per unit of output. In such a situation, the
interplay of two developments would determine changes in a country’s com-
petitiveness: reductions in the amounts of labor required per unit of output
and changes in the relative wage rates.
5 These factors are summarized by
prices (equation (9)), so that we assume that changes in a country’s shares on
the world markets are dependent on price differentials (only).
To determine the commodity-speciﬁc trade shares, we use the concept of
an inverted logistic curve, as illustrated in ﬁgure 1. In mathematical terms,
this relation between the price ratio and the ‘equilibrium’ market share of
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(13)
5 These unit labor costs are generally converted to a common currency. Hence, exchange rate










Figure 1. Trade shares.
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ratio for which the market shares are equally divided. For perfectly tradable
goods this parameter will equal zero, but for most goods the price ratio
corresponding to equal market shares will have a positive value. In this case,
the market shares of domestically produced inputs will be larger than 50 per
cent when prices are equal. The extent to which the market share at the unit
price ratio differs from 50 per cent is also dependent on the parameter j (>0),
which represents the commodity-speciﬁc sensitivity of trade shares to
changes in the price ratio. The lower j, the more sensitive the trade shares
are. The parameters j may be affected by a number of things, such as costs
of transportation, geographical distance and non-tariff trade barriers.
Trade shares are not assumed to adjust immediately to changes in prices.
We model an adjustment process, in which the gap between the actual trade
shares z and the equilibrium trade shares z* vanish gradually in the absence
of shocks:
zt zt zt z t
t + () = () − () −+ () [] 11 η * (14)
with h
t (0 < h
t < 1) denoting the speed of adjustment.
4.3 Wage rates, the exchange rate and remaining variables
The two country-speciﬁc nominal wage rates are assumed to be constant, at
least if expressed in national currencies. When technological progress reduces
the unit labor requirements, prices will consequently be reduced and the real
wage rate will grow. One caveat applies, however. In a system of ﬂexible
exchange rates, the purchasing power of a given amount of Northern cur-
rency relative to an identical amount of Southern currency may change.
In the modeling of exchange rate dynamics we use a speciﬁcation similar to
that of trade shares. The exchange rate is a weighted average of the actual
rate and an equilibrium rate based on purchasing power parity (PPP) of the
two currencies.
6
xt xt xt x t
x + () = () − () −+ () [] 11 η * (15)
6 In empirical studies, several ways to deﬁne PPP have been proposed. Our output-based
speciﬁcation in equation (16) should be considered as a convenient way to bring tendencies
towards PPP into the model, not as an expression of a preference for any speciﬁc empirical
methodology.
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x (0  h
x  1), the more a system of ﬁxed exchange rates is
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The superindices nat indicate prices expressed in national currencies.
Finally, we assume that the consumption shares of the industries are ﬁxed
in each country. Moreover, we assume that these variables do not differ
between countries. Thus, consumer preferences are assumed to be identical.
7
5. MODEL ANALYSIS
5.1 Comparative statics of innovation
Before we turn to a discussion of some of the simulation results we obtained,
we illustrate the basic effects of an innovation by a diagram that depicts some
highly simpliﬁed comparative statics. In ﬁgure 2, the axes indicate the total
consumption levels for North and South. The solid upward sloping line (I)
7 Los and Verspagen (2000) study the consequences of income-speciﬁc consumer preferences for










Figure 2. Consumption effects of innovation.
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in equilibrium in the initial situation (see equation (7)). The downward
sloping solid lines (IIN and IIS) indicate all pairs of consumption levels for
which full employment initially prevails in North and in South, respectively
(see equations (10) and (11)). The slopes of these lines will generally differ,
e.g. due to different compositions of consumption bundles with respect to
countries of origin. In the situation depicted, consumption levels are given by
the intersection point F, in which North experiences full employment and
South faces excess labor supply.
Now, suppose that North generates a labor saving innovation. Conse-
quently, the labor constraint will be less tight, and for given consumption
levels in North higher consumption levels in South are attainable, since more
‘effective’ labor is available to produce exports. This is reﬂected by the
upward shift of the Northern full employment line (dashed line IIN′). In
general, the slope will change as well, but the sign of this change depends on
the interplay of many parameter values. Nevertheless, the ‘ﬁrst-order’ effect
of technological progress in the labor-constrained country is an increase in
both North’s and South’s consumption levels.
The supposed innovation in North also has some ‘second-order’ effects.
The net effects of these are ambiguous, as will become clear after studying the
dashed lines I′ and I″. The lines represent two important opposite effects.
First, innovation yields a lower price per unit of output for North. This
implies that for a given amount of exports, North can buy fewer imports and
must reduce its consumption, while South can increase its import volume at
constant costs (I′). This is a terms-of-trade effect. Second, North’s reduced
price enhances its competitiveness relative to South, which will cause higher
market shares. Consequently, innovating North requires fewer imports per
unit of output, which enables it to produce more consumption goods. For
South the opposite holds and its attainable consumption level will fall. This
effect is documented by curve I″.
Which of the two second-order effects dominates depends on a number of
parameters and variables, of which the sensitivity of market shares to price
changes is an important one. The bottom line of this simple comparative
statics analysis is that it is impossible to tell in advance which effect will
dominate, and hence what the ultimate effect of an innovation on relative
growth rates will be.
8
8 Alternatively, we could have studied the effects of a labor-saving innovation in South. This
would lead to identical conclusions, except for the fact that it would not alleviate the scarcity of
labor in North, which is the binding constraint for the world economy in the depicted case.
Hence, the consumption levels would still remain on line IIN.
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The model often generates a particular cycle, which we dub the ‘spillover-
cumulative-learning cycle’. This is caused by the interplay between the
various forms of technological progress in the model, especially the combi-
nation of the Kaldor–Verdoorn learning and spillover effects. Since this cycle
is rather crucial for the overall analysis of the model, we discuss it here in
some detail. Under speciﬁc parameter values this cycle is a stable feature of
the model, while it dampens out with different values. We will discuss in the
next subsection how the behavior of the cycle changes under speciﬁc param-
eter values. Note that the ‘spillover-cumulative-learning cycle’ is in some
respects similar to the properties of the model proposed by Landesmann and
Stehrer (2000).
A typical situation is depicted in ﬁgure 3. The vertical axis of the upper
diagram indicates the so-called technology gap, which is deﬁned as the loga-
rithm of the ratio between the labor requirements per unit of output in a
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Figure 3. The ‘spillover-cumulative-learning cycle’.
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a negative value points towards a technological advantage of a Northern
industry. In the lower panel, the shares of North and South in the world
production of the two goods are indicated on the vertical axis (e.g. SH-N1
stands for the share of North in the world production of good 1).
As can be concluded from the upper panel of ﬁgure 3, the initial param-
eter setting represents a situation in which North has a technological
advantage in both industries. The most prominent phenomenon emerging is
that so-called ‘taking-over’ occurs at the level of industries: not only does
South take the technological lead in industry 2 after less than 20 periods,
but after a subsequent interval of about 30 periods the leadership pattern is
reversed. This taking-over happens almost simultaneously in both indus-
tries. Specialization patterns also evolve in a cyclical fashion. What drives
these cycles?
The spillover part of the dynamics consists of technological imitation that
drives the technology gap towards an equilibrium value. It is important to
note that this equilibrium value can change endogenously over the simula-
tion, and this is exactly what happens when the technology gaps alternate
between positive and negative ‘attractors’. Whether the equilibrium value is
positive or negative depends on r and the Kaldor–Verdoorn effect. The ﬁrst
of these two factors (r) always gives the leading country an advantage, since
r = 0 in the lagging country.
At the upper turning point of either one of the technology gaps in ﬁgure 3,
the lagging country has been experiencing a fall of its market share, because
the increasing gap has led to a competitive disadvantage of the lagging
country. The technology gap approaches a short-run equilibrium value,
because the spillover bonus increases, and thus offsets the effect due to r and
Kaldor–Verdoorn. Because the technology gap now stops growing, the trend
of a declining market share also stops. The laggard is now able to beneﬁt
from the generally expanding world market and realizes positive production
growth. This sets in motion the Kaldor–Verdoorn learning effect. A slow-
down of production growth in the leading country is induced because the
lagging country captures more of the market. Through the Kaldor–Verdoorn
effect, this induces a slowdown of the rate of productivity growth in the
leading country. This changes the short-run equilibrium value of the tech-
nology gap, which becomes smaller. The result is that the gap now starts to
decline.
When the gap becomes zero, the spillover bonus disappears, but now the
country becomes the leading country, and the effect due to a positive r sets
in. The other (formerly leading) country now loses the bonus due to r, but
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been chosen such that the technology gap actually reverses sign, but with
different parameter values, this does not need to happen. In particular, for
higher values of r, the leader country has such a strong advantage that the
gap does not change sign, and the lower turning point occurs on the same side
of the horizontal zero level as the upper turning point. At the lower turning
point, the same logic as for the upper turning point applies, but now with the
roles (leader or laggard) of the two countries reversed. The dynamics are
symmetric.
An important feature of ﬁgure 3 is that the Kaldor–Verdoorn mechanism
(if strong enough) enables countries with an initial productivity lag in both
industries to enter a symmetric situation in which both countries have a
technological edge in one industry. In our more systematic study of relative
performances under different parameter settings that follows in the next
subsection, we will therefore assume such a symmetric situation in the initial
periods already.
5.3 Behavior under various parameter value settings
In order to get insight into the behavior of the model beyond simple com-
parative statics, we resort to simulation analysis. We concentrate on the set of
parameters related to technological progress, i.e. r, k, s and a. The number
of industries is set to two in all simulations. To keep the analysis as tractable
as possible, we choose our basic parameter conﬁguration in a way that both
goods and both countries are (initially) as similar as possible. Exact param-
eter values are documented in the Appendix, which shows that the produc-
tion processes of both goods in North and South are initially the same, except
for a very small difference in labor requirements to induce differences
between the two countries in terms of the regimes of technological progress.
Each country is assumed to be the technological leader in one industry. Initial
trade shares are all equal. The only difference between industries lies in the
consumption shares: good 1 is consumed four times as much as good 2. With
respect to the other parameters that govern the dynamic processes, the two
goods are perfectly identical.
The main variable that we are interested in is the aggregate level of inequal-
itybetweencountries,whichwemeasureastheabsolutevalueofthelogarithm
oftheratiobetweenthemacroeconomiclaborproductivitylevelsinNorthand
South, averaged over the simulation period of a single run. All results are
based on 250 periods, of which the ﬁrst 100 were not used because they show
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9 An inequality indicator of, say, 0.4
thus means that the aggregate labor productivity levels differ on average by a
factor e
0.4 ª 1.5. To illustrate some of the general tendencies of the model, we
show in ﬁgure 4 the results for a range of values of r, while simultaneously
switchingonorofftheotherformsoftechnologicalprogress.Intheﬁgure,the
inequality indicator is depicted on the vertical axis (higher values indicate
more inequality). Values on the horizontal axis denote the value of r. The
valuesforsandaare6.0and0.2,respectively.Wepickthevalueofk suchthat
the Kaldor–Verdoorn mechanism yields a 1 per cent growth rate of labor
productivity for a growth rate of production equal to 1 per cent.
The ﬁgure contains four lines. The ﬁrst one is denoted by ‘none’, which
indicatesthatboththespilloverparametersandthegrowthrateimpliedbythe
Kaldor–Verdoorn mechanism (cumulative learning) are set equal to zero. We
seethatthiscurverisessteeplyinthesegmentofverylowratesoftechnological





























































with n = 2, t0 = 100 and T = 250. The term between brackets indicates that aggregate labor
productivity is measured in quantities of outputs over labor requirements. This amounts to











Figure 4. Effects of innovation rates on productivity gaps.
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Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltdprogress in the leading industries, reaches a maximum average aggregate
technology gap for r = 0.001 and approaches zero for larger values of r. This
tendency towards zero is perhaps easiest to grasp. South is the leader in
industry 1 and will thus also innovate in this industry. North is the leader and
innovator in industry 2. Without any other ways of productivity increase,
there is no way for the follower to converge to the leader, and the price gap
between the two countries for each good will grow. Complete specialization is
the result. Since both the rates of technological progress and the initial labor
productivity levels are equal for both industries in this set of simulations, this
will lead to equal macroeconomic levels of labor productivity.
10
However, at low rates of innovation, we see the level of disparity between
the countries rising with r. The reason for this is that specialization is less
pronounced in this case, and both countries remain active forever in the
industry in which they have a competitive disadvantage. This most heavily
affects North, since it attracts the same share of the world production of good
1asSouthattractsoftheworldproductionofgood2,butthemarketforgood
1 is much larger. Consequently, more labor is allocated to low-productivity
activities in North. This effect is obviously absent for r = 0, but increases for
smallpositivevaluesofr.Thisisreﬂectedintherisingtrendofdisparity.When
completespecializationstartstoemergeforhighervaluesofr,thecurvepeaks
and starts to fall towards zero in the way already described.
Introduction of the Kaldor–Verdoorn cumulative causation mechanism
(line ‘KV’) leaves these dynamics essentially unchanged, but increases the
intensity. Specialization in an industry causes output growth, which in turn
leads to productivity growth and even more specialization. If the annual
long-run growth rate implied by the Kaldor–Verdoorn mechanism is set at
0.01, very low levels of r (in the order of magnitude of 0.001) are already
sufﬁcient to reach almost full specialization before period 100. Hence the
‘KV’ line jumps up immediately after r = 0, but falls directly after that.
With only technological imitation of leaders by laggards being present, the
nature of the dynamics is again similar (the ‘alfa’ line). A positive rate of
innovation for leaders and a positive spillover rate for laggards imply con-
vergence towards a constant technology gap, and therefore a constant degree
of specialization. The higher r for the given value of a, the stronger is the
long-run degree of specialization. Hence, for high values of r, specialization
is almost complete and both countries perform equally well according to the
macroeconomic labor productivity yardstick. For low r, we observe the same
10 It should be noted that this does not lead to equal GDP levels: the unequal consumption
shares cause unemployment in the country that produces the good that is relatively unpopular
with the consumers.
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productivity levels of both industries in a country deviate much less, because
of the tendency to converge to a ﬁxed gap. Hence incomplete specialization is
relatively harmless in terms of aggregate technology gaps. This is why the
upward sloping part of the curve covers a wider span of r.
The by far most dramatic effects of changes in the rate of innovation in the
leading industries are found if Kaldor–Verdoorn effects and spillovers are
simultaneously taken into account (line ‘alfa + KV’). In this case, the type of
dynamics that was described in the discussion of ﬁgure 3 starts to play a role.
In particular, the steep rise and decline of labor productivity differentials in
the range of rs after the value r = 0.009 deserves special attention. It turns
out that this sudden change of behavior of the aggregate productivity gap is
due to a qualitative change in the ‘spillover-cumulative-learning cycle’.
To the left of the point r = 0.009, the ‘spillover-cumulative-learning cycle’
unfolds as in ﬁgure 3, i.e. leadership periodically switches between the coun-
tries and the sign of the technology gaps reverses. The amplitude of the
technology gap cycles is relatively small, i.e. the upper and lower turner
points occur at relatively small (absolute) values of the gaps. Specialization
patterns co-evolve with the technology gaps, and this yields inequality as
described in the discussion of ﬁgure 3.
To the right of the ‘bifurcation point’ at r = 0.009, the technology gaps no
longer change signs, and technological leadership always remains with one
country. This is due to the fact that the bonus for the technological leader (r)
is now so high that it prevents taking-over. As a result, trade specialization
does not change sign over time, and this leads to a higher aggregate produc-
tivity gap because it is now always just one of the countries beneﬁting from
the larger market for good 1. In fact, at values of r just slightly larger than
0.009, model behavior is characterized by the ‘spillover-cumulative-learning
cycle’, until after a considerable number of periods the technology gaps start
to converge to equilibrium values leading to a ﬁxed, incomplete specialization
pattern. We cannot give a clear explanation of what drives this regime change
and its timing, but rather consider it as an example of non-steady-state
aspects of the technology–growth relations stressed by our model.
The sharp drop in the ‘alfa + KV’ line at r = 0.011 corresponds to a situ-
ation in which South is the technological leader in both industries. The
technology gap for North is equal in the two industries, and hence no
specialization occurs: the share of North (South) in both industries is equal to
each other. Specialization does not induce inequality in this case. To the right
of the point r = 0.011, the behavior of the model does not change in a
qualitative sense. Specialization becomes more pronounced, however, and
hence inequality grows.
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both industries. The tendency for the equilibrium technology gaps to grow
does not stop, due to the increasing r. Consequently, prices between the two
countries keep diverging. Because of the complete specialization, the trade
shares of both countries for the goods in which they are specialized cannot
grow further, and the only effect of the price differentials is on the terms of
trade. In terms of the discussion of ﬁgure 2 above, this means that one of the
two second-order effects (associated to a shift of the balance-of-payments
restriction line in ﬁgure 2) disappears. This causes more equality, which is
reﬂected by the huge drop of the ‘alfa + KV’ curve in ﬁgure 4 for innovation
rate values that exceed r = 0.024. For very high values of r, the ‘alfa + KV’
curve and the ‘alfa’ curve coincide, which reﬂects that the strong effects of
exogenous innovations dominate the Kaldor–Verdoorn effect.
The point of the model is not so much to explain speciﬁc ﬁgures like
ﬁgure 4. After all, by choosing different values of the parameters, or even by
plotting values of a different parameter on the horizontal axis, it would be
possible to generate quite different ﬁgures. Thus, ﬁgure 4 should only be
considered as an illustration of the type of mechanisms that exist in the
model, and the way they interact. In order to paint a broader picture of the
range of possible outcomes, we proceed to vary the technological change
parameters in a systematic way against each other.
In ﬁgure 5, we plot the macroeconomic productivity gap indicator that
featuredinﬁgure 5againsttwotechnology-relatedparameters,theinnovation



















Figure 5. Joint effects of innovation and spillovers on productivity gaps.
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s is held constant at 3.0. Dark (light) regions indicate parameter conﬁgura-
tions for which the inequality indicator is high (low). The picture looks rather
chaotic for some ranges of parameter values, but some tendencies emerge
immediately. For very low values of r and very high values of a, the gaps are
small. This is due to the well-known logic from technology gap theories of
growth that equilibrium gaps are low for such parameter conﬁgurations. The
technology gaps are thus small in both industries.
At ﬁrst sight, the ﬁnding that the gaps are small for the opposite conﬁgu-
ration, in which exogenous innovation is high and spillovers are virtually
absent, may appear less straightforward. In this case, complete specialization
prevails. Further, the terms-of-trade effect discussed with respect to the
right-hand-side range of r values in ﬁgure 4 applies. The diagonally oriented
combinations of r and a values that produce large productivity gaps corre-
spond to the situation in which industry-level gaps are large but specializa-
tion is not yet complete. The steep decline ‘to the southeast’ also corresponds
to the steep decline found in ﬁgure 4. Finally, no clear-cut pattern can be
detected for the range characterized by low values of r and low to medium
values of a. This is partly due to the presence of situations in which one
country becomes the productivity leader in both industries and specialization
hardly occurs (note in particular the ‘narrow valley’ for rs approximately
equal to 0.02 and as higher than about 0.15).
The relationship between the aggregate productivity gap on the one hand
and the innovation rate r and cumulative learning mechanism s on the other
is depicted in ﬁgure 6. The value of the spillover parameter a is held constant
at 0.2.
For very low values of s, the aggregate productivity gap is huge (note the
difference in the indicator values associated with a given level of darkness,
relative to the ﬁgure 6). This is due to the fact that a modest growth of output
leads to a substantial increase in productivity in this range of s values.
Consequently, the cycles from ﬁgure 3 have much higher amplitudes
(industry-speciﬁc gaps will be large) and the frequency of the cycles is much
higher. Specialization patterns change quickly, but full specialization occurs
often. Hence, aggregate productivity gaps change sign quite often, but are
large in the majority of time periods. This effect is reinforced if r takes on
relatively high values, as is evidenced by the border between the lightest and
lightest but one shade.
For higher values of s (exceeding 2.5), another interesting phenomenon
emerges from the ﬁgure. Both low and high values of r yield small gaps on
average, whereas intermediate values yield larger gaps. Again, this resembles
the hump shape observed in ﬁgure 4. For low values, gaps and specialization
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to negative terms of trade effects, inequality declines for higher r values. The
inverse relation between r and s that characterizes this ‘ridge of divergence’
is due to the strong Kaldor–Verdoorn effect, which promotes cyclical behav-
ior. Thus, for a low value of s, which indicates strong cumulative learning
effects, a high exogenous innovation parameter value r is required to offset
this tendency and obtain full specialization.
Finally, ﬁgure 7 gives an impression of the model’s behavior for combina-
tions of varying spillover parameter a and the learning-by-doing parameter
s. The exogenous innovation rate is held constant at 0.025. As in ﬁgure 6, the
productivity inequality is huge for low values of s. Again, this is due to large
productivity gaps at the industry level and fast reversals of specialization
patterns. It should be noted, however, that a relatively modest strength of the
cumulative learning mechanism sufﬁces to generate such patterns for low
values of a. This is due to the fact that weak spillovers yield large short-run
equilibrium gaps for a given innovation rate. Consequently, leader industries
can beneﬁt to a signiﬁcant extent from learning-by-doing.
Another noticeable feature is the ‘ridge of divergence’ that emerges for
conﬁgurations with high values of a and s. On the left of this ridge, the
aggregate gaps are small, due to the terms-of-trade effects that also cause the
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Figure 6. Joint effects of innovation and learning-by-doing on productivity gaps.
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ﬁgure 6. High values of r and low values of a both yield large equilibrium
technology gaps at the industry level. On the right-hand side of the ridge,
spillovers are so strong that technology gaps at the industry level remain very
small. Thus, specialization is far from complete, but because labor produc-
tivity levels between industries do not deviate much, this does not have strong
effects on macroeconomic productivity gaps.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The two-country-two-industry model that was developed in this paper inte-
grates a number of well-known partial determinants of economic growth.
First, demand-side and supply-side mechanisms were merged. The post-
Keynesian notion that the rate of export expansion limits the attainable
output growth rate was combined with the more mainstream argument that
output growth is determined by the increasing availability of production
factors or the growth of their productivity. In the model, the latter determines
the size of the world markets, whereas the former play an important role in
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Figure 7. Joint effects of spillovers and learning-by-doing on productivity gaps.
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the sources of technological progress. The model distinguishes between two
regimes, one in which the industry is on the technological frontier, and one in
which the industry lags its foreign competitor in terms of labor productivity.
Both regimes have one source of productivity growth in common: the ben-
eﬁts from learning-by-doing, speciﬁed as a causal relationship from output
growth to productivity growth. Further, exogenous productivity growth is
present in the leader regime. In the laggard regime, the industry can beneﬁt
from knowledge that cannot be appropriated by the competing industry at
the productivity frontier.
The model is set up in a very general way, so that it can be helpful in
analyzing a wide range of issues regarding relations between technological
change, trade and growth. The generality of the model comes at the cost of
complexity, and we resort to simulation experiments for analysis of the
model. The focus of these experiments was on the effects of the three sources
of technological progress on relative performance in aggregate labor produc-
tivity levels and trade specialization. The chosen parameter conﬁgurations
were such that the two industries we distinguish were as identical as possible
between countries, with the exception of their share in consumption demand.
The latter then induces specialization between the countries.
Under these circumstances, the simulations showed that small changes in
parameter values might have substantial effects on the relative performance
of the two countries. In particular, in cases in which the three sources of
technological change were assumed to be in operation simultaneously, we
found several ‘bifurcation values’ that demarcate ranges of parameter values
for which industry-level productivity growth, structural change and interna-
tional specialization interact in quite different ways.
Our results thus show that the dynamics of innovation, spillovers and
learning are far from simple. The parameter space of our model has large
subspaces in which productivity convergence between the countries is far
from automatic, and divergence rules. Cases of ‘automatic convergence’
(often assumed in empirical work on growth) seem to be only islands in a sea
with (big) waves of divergence. From this result, we draw two sets of con-
clusions, one with regard to the literature on convergence and divergence of
productivity levels, and one with regard to policy.
With regard to the existing literature, our model is in line with the con-
clusion (e.g. Abramovitz, 1979; Fagerberg, 1994) that convergence is by no
means an automatic process that will unfold itself as a natural traverse
towards a steady state. However, while the existing literature mostly
reaches this conclusion on the basis of arguments on the complexity of
technological change as a process (e.g. difﬁculties associated to imitating
Productivity Gaps and Specialization Patterns 489
© 2006 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltdforeign technology), our model adds to this the complexity of economic
structure. The (bi-causal) interaction between economic structure and tech-
nological change adds complexity to the story, but it may also increase the
level of empirical reality of the theory, especially if applied to countries that
are relatively close to each other in terms of the general level of techno-
logical knowledge. We hope to be able to put (parts of) our model to the
empirical test in a future paper.
With regard to policy, we draw two conclusions. The ﬁrst one refers to the
issue of trade policy in general. The model shows that free trade may in many
cases lead to a situation in which the productivity gaps between countries are
signiﬁcant. This suggests that there are winners and losers from trade, where
losers (winners) are those countries for which the (endogenous) specialization
pattern implies low (high) growth. This ﬁnding is not an argument against
free trade, since no static welfare analysis, or a ‘counterfactual’ of growth
patterns under autarky, has been undertaken. But the results do show that
under free trade, a loss of growth potential and/or an increase of technology
gaps may result in some speciﬁc cases. This can be interpreted as a warning
against a too simple representation of the free trade argument, sometimes
found in the popular debate, suggesting that knowledge spillovers associated
with free trade will erase all technology gaps in the long run. It can also be
interpreted as a plea for thinking further about the circumstances under
which industrial and technology policies can be admitted as useful instru-
ments for development and breaking out of ‘bad’ specialization patterns.
The second policy conclusion refers to the interplay between speciﬁc poli-
cies, and the expected results of these. The model suggests that convergence
of productivity levels is not achieved by single issue-oriented approaches.
Convergence is a more complex process than just (for example) enhancing
social capability or technological congruence (Abramovitz, 1979). As an
example, our results indicated that the results of increasing social capability
(similar to the a parameter in our model) greatly depend on other param-
eters, e.g. the rate of learning-by-doing (the s parameter in our model). Low
values of the rate of learning-by-doing prohibit convergence even if social
capability is high (ﬁgure 7).
But picking the right policy mix is far from straightforward. Because
specialization emerges and changes endogenously, the results of speciﬁc poli-
cies aimed at productivity increases may have unexpected results. This is
largely the result of the fact that the model shows bifurcations, i.e. the
possibility that qualitative outcomes of the model (such as whether or not
industry-level productivity leadership switches periodically, or whether or
not specialization is complete) change at some threshold value of one or
several parameters. From the point of view of policy, this implies that the
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policy aimed at increasing learning-by-doing at the ﬁrm level may shift the
whole economy into a different regime, in which the result of the increased
learning rate is adverse. In the real world, as opposed to our model, these
regime changes (bifurcations) may be subtle and reveal themselves only after
some time. They are probably also much less easy to detect in terms of causal
relations than in our simple model. Although we cannot stretch the results
from the model too far, we suggest that, at least at a metaphorical level, the
complexity of these dynamics may be seen as one of the reasons why coun-
tries that started with roughly similar initial conditions experienced so widely
different growth patterns. For example, countries in South-East Asia have
been able to converge to the world productivity frontier during the second
half of the 20th century, while Latin American countries have mostly been
left behind.
The controlled simulation experiments in this paper have only explored a
small subset of the possible dynamics in this respect. A more complete
analysis of the policy implications would require searching a larger part of
parameter space of the model. For example, our assumption (implemented
for analytical transparency) that parameter values do not differ between
countries (or industries) is clearly at odds with the idea of policy differences
between countries. We expect that different dynamics may emerge if we
would allow the parameters to vary between industries and/or countries. But
what we expect to be a robust conclusion is that ﬁnding the right mix of
policies may be more a matter of trial-and-error than of implementing a
grand design on the basis of the insights of economic theories.
APPENDIX
Parameter and initial variable conﬁguration
The values below were used as the benchmark values for ﬁgures 5–7. It was
also used to generate the ‘alfa + KV’ line in ﬁgure 4 for various values of
r1 = r2.
11 Unless stated otherwise, the documented values refer to both North
and South, and to both industry 1 and industry 2.
11 Note that ﬁgure 4 was generated with s = 6.0 and k=0.021544. The implied long-run growth
rate of the Kaldor–Verdoorn parameters was thus maintained at 0.01 per period.
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sup (labor supply levels)
0.8 h
x (exchange rate adjustment parameter)
0.8; 0.2 b1; b2 (consumption shares)
0.2 a (spillover parameters)
3.0 s (Kaldor–Verdoorn parameters)
0.046416 k (Kaldor–Verdoorn parameters)
0.05 j (trade share adjustment parameters)
0.0 e (trade share adjustment parameters)
0.5 h
t (trade share adjustment parameter)
160.0; 40.0 q1; q2 (initial output levels)
200.0 f(-1) (total consumption levels in period -1)










S2 (initial labor requirements in South)
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